Must we call genocide “genocide”?
The Armenian genocide? Or The Armenian mass killings? And does it matter?
In a debate that seems to recur every few years, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs voted today to condemn as “genocide”, the mass killing of Armenians during and after World War I. Like in 2007, the last time an Armenian Genocide resolution came up, the Administration (then Bush, today Obama), sought to halt the vote - both times to no avail.
Unlike with the situation in Darfur, the hesitancy to use the word “genocide” stems not from worries about the responsibilities to which the use of the word would commit the United States, but from simple geopolitics. Turkey, while acknowledging that as many as 1.5 million Armenians died at the hands of Ottoman Turks, has always denied that the deaths were part of a planned orchestrated campaign - a prerequisite for calling them “genocide.” And fearing the genocide label would tar their national reputation, Turkey has long fought the official declaration by other governments of the events as such. Because of this lobbying, only twenty countries, to date, have recognized the Armenian genocide. Read more
For Sale: Acropolis
German politicians yesterday argued that Greece should sell some uninhabited islands and historical monuments, like the Acropolis and Parthenon, in order to stave off bankruptcy. This raises some questions about the E.U. and international justice: What is the moral relationship between EU states? Is the E.U. simply a dense network of treaties amongst independent states or the beginning of a brand new, full-bodied people? How much sacrifice of one E.U. state is required to help another in need? Only that which is required explicitly by treaty? How “special” are the obligations between E.U. citizens in different countries, meaning to what extent are their obligations to fellow E.U. citizens greater than those owed to foreign strangers? What is the relationship between common identity and special obligations? Between shared institutional structures and special obligations?
-Jake
Cow ethics ctd.
Marginal Revolution tackles the relevant and complicated world of cow ethics:
If each cow brought to life adds even some small bit of cow utility to the grand total of cow welfare must not beef eaters be lauded, at least if they are hungry enough? Or is the pro beef-eater argument simply repugnant?
Maybe it’s ruining the fun to say so, but the distinction is that, at least to our knowledge, cows are unaware of their impending doom, or at least handle it very well. Overall quality of life for a cow could be very good up until the very last moment. The real challenge is not just the “pro beef-eater argument,” that cows will eventually be slaughtered, but that their lives are often of poor quality.
Then there’s the question of whether an additional marginal cow lowers the quality of life of each existing cow. One could make the argument that additional cows tend to decrease beef prices, forcing ranchers to lower costs by treating cattle worse in some way (overcrowding, low-quality feed, etc).
-John
Wrangling over ethics
What should come of Charles Rangel?
Charles Rangel, senior Member of the House of Representatives from New York and chair of the Ways and Means Committee (which writes tax laws), has agreed to relinquish his committee gavel after a months-long imbroglio involving allegations of privately-funded jaunts and failure to report income derived from real estate holdings.
What may seem less odd to congressional pundits and more odd to an ethicist is why so many are calling for him to give up his chairmanship as opposed to resigning from Congress altogether. Is there a method to the madness, or is everything political posturing? Read more
What is a public intellectual?
Commenter Erik made an interesting point about my Krugman piece:
While you make an (interesting) case for Krugman as a “successful public intellectual”, I don’t think it ultimately succeeds. There is no doubt that Krugman is a first-rate economist, and perhaps, one of the best trade economists of all time.
Having said that, I believe being an even-handed evaluator of ideas is necessary to be a “successful public intellectual.” Krugman falls down on this account. While he sometimes criticizes the left and right alike, most often he brushes aside counter arguments through best at intellectual sophistry, and worst through repeated ad hominum attacks. I have seen him on many panels, and each time he speaks, I don’t come away with a feeling that he has honestly engaged the issue more than using it as a podium to pound his ideological position. Indeed, Isaiah Berlin, perhaps one of the best public intellectuals of all time, was respected for listening and responding thoughtfully to his critics. If that’s even a consideration in determining a public intellectual, Krugman fails miserably.
Managing risk
The earthquake in Chile this weekend was 500 times more powerful than the one that hit Haiti in January. Yet the death toll in Haiti was 300 times greater than in Chile (though numbers there will probably rise further). Why? In Haiti, most of the deaths were the result of building collapses. In Chile, a country with frequent tremblers, the enactment and enforcement of building codes seems to have successfully prevented most structures from collapsing (though they may be heavily damaged and in need of rebuilding).
While we will never prevent all threats and hazards from occurring, we can take steps to minimize risk. But this, of course, costs money. So we are left with a normative question that must be answered. How much risk should we buy down? Should we spend money to earthquake proof buildings in New York City, where a 6.0-magnitude quake will happen there every 670 years or so, recognizing the scale of destruction should an event could cause? Or is that a risk worth accepting? Should we issue tsunami warnings every time there is a possibility of such an event (as was done this weekend). Or are the economic costs of evacuating large parts of island nations so great that we should only issue warnings when we are confident that a tsunami will occur? The philosophical literature on risk management is quite slim, though a former TA of mine is trying to change that. These are hard questions. Any thoughts?
-Marc
If video games lead to violence, should government regulate them?
The Washington Post’s health blog, The Check Up, writes about a study published this month in Psychological Bulletin demonstrating a link between playing violent video games and violent thinking, attitudes and behavior. There has long been a debate about the regulation of sex and violence on TV and in video games. Does this study support the case for banning or regulating video games? Can any amount of empirical evidence justify government intrusion in personal choices?
-Marc
When should politicians resign?
As the New York Times breaks news of more questionable behavior by New York Governor David Paterson, the question on everyone’s minds is will he resign. As of now he maintains that he will not. But the more relevant question for the public philosopher is not will he resign, but should he resign. What do you think? Under what conditions should politicians resign? When they break the law? When they lose the confidence of the voters? When they lose the ability to govern effectively? When they lie?
-Marc
Religion and foreign aid
I owe thanks to Nicholas Kristof for publishing a piece on religious missionaries in the NYT the day after I was discussing this issue with friends.
Kristof reminds us that religious groups are doing great humanitarian work. He reminds us that
Some Americans assume that religious groups offer aid to entice converts. That’s incorrect. Today, groups like World Vision ban the use of aid to lure anyone into a religious conversation.
I’m sure I’m one of the “some Americans” Kristof has in mind. I’ll freely concede that humanitarian work is good regardless of the reason why it’s done. I think a convincing argument could also be made that humanitarian aid would still be good even if it was used as a “lure” for conversion, if that’s the only way that the aid would be allocated. However, I don’t think Kristof takes seriously enough the case against faith-based intervention. He writes:
A root problem is a liberal snobbishness toward faith-based organizations. Those doing the sneering typically give away far less money than evangelicals. They’re also less likely to spend vacations volunteering at, say, a school or a clinic in Rwanda.
Accusations of elitism or “snoobbishness” generally point to poor argumentation to follow. The critique against faith-based groups is more serious than Kristof believes.
It’s never clear where commitments end and humanitarianism begins. The issue of condoms is a good example. Faith-based organizations that do not provide condom distribution are doing their constituency a grave disservice. if secular international organizations are not on the ground because the most pressing needs are being addressed (hunger, disease) by faith-based groups, there’s no locus in which good policy can be made. When aid money is channeled through government organizations, there’s room for an open debate on best practices. This debate cannot happen when aid money is simply granted to religious organizations. Fundamentally, Kristoff is ignoring that to at least some extent, the aid channeled through religious organizations trades off with aid provided by secular NGOs or governments.
The tragic case of Ugandan efforts to pass a law punishing homosexuality by death are another example. This farce was supported by a few US evangelical groups; probably the groups Kristof praises had nothing to do with it. But what will those groups do to actively oppose such initiatives? (Perhaps this is colonialism, and therefore should also be opposed by us snobs.)
But of course, Kristof is right in his central point — that many faith-based organizations do a lot of good and do not actively contribute to these harms. However, while he’s able to mention one group that seems to keep it’s religious commitments away from its humanitarianism, us pointy-headed liberal snobs are right to stay on guard.
-John
Long lost Descartes letter found
Less public, more philosopher…
-Jake
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I’ll have to defer on Krugman’s performance on panels as I’ve never seen him speak in person. My comments below only apply to his NYT column. (I think this focus is justified by the fact that the NYT column is far and away his most “public” venue and the one that marks Krugman as a public intellectual rather than academic or DC wonk.
I think Erik is right that a public intellectual needs to engage the arguments of his or her opponents. To the extent that Krugman doesn’t do this, he should. But, I’m not sure that a public intellectual needs to be “even-handed.” Krugman is, politically, a liberal, and it’s clear that he brings those commitments with him to his work.
I also think that Krugman’s goals in his public work (as opposed to academic work) are political. He’s trying to convince an audience of something. To do this, your certainly want to address relevant counter-arguments, but you don’t necessarily need to address all of them. This may knock you down in the “even-handed” department, but I’m not sure that’s the goal.
As I argued previously, what sets Krugman apart is the sense that he’s making arguments in good faith. While he is advancing his political cause, I myself never get the sense that he’s making arguments disingenuously to that end. His reputation, built as an economist, is what sustains him as a public intellectual.
-John