Hate speech and the Constitution
If he contributes nothing else to society, the infamous Fred Phelps has at least forced us to further examine the notion of free speech. At what point does offensive expression become punishable under the law?
Phelps is the leader of the Westboro Baptist Church, which has gained notoriety over the past decade as a result of its practice of protesting military funerals with signs that read “Thank God for IEDs,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” and of course “God Hates Fags.” The group believes that our losses in the War on Terror (along with the suffering from Hurricane Katrina and from the economic recession) are part of God’s punishment for our tolerating homosexuality.
The Supreme Court will now hear Snyder v. Phelps, in which the family of a deceased Marine has sued for damages after Phelps et al showed up en force at their son’s funeral. Most Americans would universally and absolutely condemn the church’s actions. But should they be illegal? If the Court sides against Phelps, would that not open the door to further litigation and regulation of “unsavory” speech?
Truly, one of the law’s most difficult conundrums.
-Colin
Religion and foreign aid
I owe thanks to Nicholas Kristof for publishing a piece on religious missionaries in the NYT the day after I was discussing this issue with friends.
Kristof reminds us that religious groups are doing great humanitarian work. He reminds us that
Some Americans assume that religious groups offer aid to entice converts. That’s incorrect. Today, groups like World Vision ban the use of aid to lure anyone into a religious conversation.
I’m sure I’m one of the “some Americans” Kristof has in mind. I’ll freely concede that humanitarian work is good regardless of the reason why it’s done. I think a convincing argument could also be made that humanitarian aid would still be good even if it was used as a “lure” for conversion, if that’s the only way that the aid would be allocated. However, I don’t think Kristof takes seriously enough the case against faith-based intervention. He writes:
A root problem is a liberal snobbishness toward faith-based organizations. Those doing the sneering typically give away far less money than evangelicals. They’re also less likely to spend vacations volunteering at, say, a school or a clinic in Rwanda.
Accusations of elitism or “snoobbishness” generally point to poor argumentation to follow. The critique against faith-based groups is more serious than Kristof believes.
It’s never clear where commitments end and humanitarianism begins. The issue of condoms is a good example. Faith-based organizations that do not provide condom distribution are doing their constituency a grave disservice. if secular international organizations are not on the ground because the most pressing needs are being addressed (hunger, disease) by faith-based groups, there’s no locus in which good policy can be made. When aid money is channeled through government organizations, there’s room for an open debate on best practices. This debate cannot happen when aid money is simply granted to religious organizations. Fundamentally, Kristoff is ignoring that to at least some extent, the aid channeled through religious organizations trades off with aid provided by secular NGOs or governments.
The tragic case of Ugandan efforts to pass a law punishing homosexuality by death are another example. This farce was supported by a few US evangelical groups; probably the groups Kristof praises had nothing to do with it. But what will those groups do to actively oppose such initiatives? (Perhaps this is colonialism, and therefore should also be opposed by us snobs.)
But of course, Kristof is right in his central point — that many faith-based organizations do a lot of good and do not actively contribute to these harms. However, while he’s able to mention one group that seems to keep it’s religious commitments away from its humanitarianism, us pointy-headed liberal snobs are right to stay on guard.
-John
The (im)possibility of secular judgment
Stanley Fish (whose articles consistently elicit a response from me) has an interesting piece up on two troublesome distinctions in liberal thought: the distinction between religious and secular reasons and the distinction between public and private reasons. As is often the case, the article is really a supportive book review in disguise - this time of law professor Steven Smith’s “The Disenchantment of Secular Discourse.”
“Classical Liberals,” according to Fish, have long argued that when it comes to political debate, religious or value-laden arguments are inadmissible, since they operate on assumptions that are not universally shared or provable. Instead, they argue, we should rely squarely on “secular reason” to do the job of here-and-now policy-making.
But according to Smith / Fish, “secular reason” can’t actually solve ANY of our political problems. At least not without “smuggling in” some of that which it despises - metaphysical assumptions, values, and comprehensive doctrines. Science and reason can’t tell us what to do with data; we must choose how to use the tools of reason, what to aim them at, how to interpret information, and which facts really matter. Reason alone can’t do all of that picking, choosing, and ranking - we need some kind of substantive value system to do that.
Reason and faith in higher education
How should universities teach religion, if at all? It’s a touchy subject - one that even the mighty Harvard has struggled to wrap its collective head around. That’s the subject of an interesting recent Newsweek piece by Lisa Miller.
Miller tells the story of a general curriculum conflict at Harvard between those who want to integrate faith and spirituality into course requirements (via a mandatory module called “Reason and Faith”) and those who would rather keep religion out of the classroom. The author sides with the former group, suggesting that “[t]o dismiss the importance of the study of faith—especially now—out of academic narrow-mindedness is less than unhelpful. It’s unreasonable.”
Steven Pinker, the well-known evolutionary psychologist, led the charge against the “Reason and Faith” module, arguing that the university’s mission is not to give a platform to all popular claims, but to pursue knowledge through rational inquiry. Teaching the importance of faith - at least as part of a mandatory curriculum requirement - would be anathema to that mission. Read more
What the Framers intended
After watching this humorous video on the diversity of opinion among members of the same religion, I got to thinking about how such a phenomenon applies more broadly to philosophy.
It’s true that in a medium like religious faith, it’s near impossible to tell who’s interpreting the moral, political, and historical claims of a particular tradition correctly. God tends, suspiciously, to agree with all of our personal opinions.
The same can be said for America’s Framers. Our nation is home to a wide variety of political philosophies, and I’d bet you would be hard-pressed to find many that don’t claim the Framers as tacit supporters. There’s a conservative Christian movement in Texas right now that aims to alter school curriculum and textbooks in order to teach children the true intent of the Founding Fathers - to create a strong, Christian nation that would carry out Jesus’s mandate on Earth. Meanwhile, Christopher Hitchens insists that the Founders were Enlightenment Deists, committed only to a vague, secularized spirituality and interested in avoiding the interference of religion with politics, science, and ethics.
The “American Tradition,” like its religious counterparts, is as contested as it is loved.
-Colin
The Tebow ad, Continued…
So here it is, as it aired:
Not much controversial material there (viewers were told to visit Focus on the Family’s website for the full story, including Christian references and anti-abortion argument), but we’ve all heard plenty about the ad’s intent by this point.
But there’s more to debate here than the ad’s propriety - what about the validity of the argument? The argument being made is a version of the famous “Beethoven example” used by the pro-life community:
“About the terminating of pregnancy, I want your opinion. The father was syphilitic. The mother tuberculous. Of the four children born, the first was blind, the second died, the third was deaf and dumb, the fourth was also tuberculous. What would you have done?”
“I would have terminated the pregnancy.”
“Then you would have murdered Beethoven.”
Convincing, eh? Had Tebow’s mother made what many pro-choice advocates suggest is the “right decision,” we wouldn’t have her successful son Tim. Richard Dawkins rebuts this logic, reminding us that by the same reasoning, we should equally condemn each act of abstinence; after all, every decision NOT to have procreative sex deprives the world of a potential genius. Also, in order for Tim to exist, some 40 million rival sperm lost out in the race to an egg. One of those sperm could have grown up to cure cancer. Is Tim Tebow the man who prevented that cure? These thought experiments are quite interesting, and worth thinking about if we want to get our logic straight on abortion.
(That’s setting aside the factual inaccuracies of the example, as Beethoven was the eldest child, none of his siblings were blind, deaf, or dumb, and his father did not have syphilis).
-Colin
Douthat on religious dialogue
Ross Douthat, that New York Times’s new conservative editorial writer, has a solid take on the demands of a functional, secular, and religiously diverse state. He’s responding, for the most part, to Brit Hume’s statement about Tiger Woods’s religious beliefs and the subsequent response, which we addressed here. Hume may have been imprudent and/or inaccurate, but the overwhelming “religion is a private matter!” response, Douthat argues, needs some examination. Many believers have balked at the use of major media outlets to express religious opinions,
But these believers are colluding in their own marginalization. If you treat your faith like a hothouse flower, too vulnerable to survive in the crass world of public disputation, then you ensure that nobody will take it seriously. The idea that religion is too mysterious, too complicated or too personal to be debated on cable television just ensures that it never gets debated at all.
He outlines a preferable vision in his opening:
Liberal democracy offers religious believers a bargain. Accept, as a price of citizenship, that you may never impose your convictions on your neighbor, or use state power to compel belief. In return, you will be free to practice your own faith as you see fit — and free, as well, to compete with other believers (and nonbelievers) in the marketplace of ideas.
The idea that believers must compete in the “marketplace of ideas” is a controversial one. Many would rather that religious communities maintain a level of protected autonomy (including the right to educate children in religious schools and perhaps protection from state interference or even public criticism) and that in matters so central to their identity, others should simply stay out of it. But our moral faculties and the well-being of our religiously diverse democracy rely on open discussion of important questions. And as Douthat suggests, these are indeed important questions.
-Colin
Banning blasphemy
A new law in Ireland can fine a person up to $35,000 if they publish or utter “matter that is grossly abusive or insulting in relation to matters held sacred by any religion, thereby causing outrage among a substantial number of the adherents of that religion.” Despite the undefined nature of “substantial number”, the law is a major challenge to free speech in Ireland. According to a Washington Post article, an atheist organization in Ireland is directly challenging the law by publicly posting blasphemous quotations from major religious and literary figures in history. We’ve written numerous times about the boundaries of free expression. Most likely there is a worthwhile line between free speech and hate speech, but has Ireland gone too far?
-Marc
Was Brit Hume right?
Brit Hume’s comments re: Tiger Woods are making the rounds on cable news. Hume noted Tiger Woods’ commitments to Buddhism and suggested that Christianity offers more opportunity for forgiveness and redemption.
The progressive blogs are aflame, with Ezra Klein noting that had Hume recommended a conversion to Islam he would have been fired; Ta-Nehisi Coates calls it “religion as chauvinism.” Both are probably correct.
I have to admit, I think Hume might have blundered onto a real insight. (Here’s my disclaimer: no, I don’t think that actual Brit Hume knows much about Buddhism, and probably not terribly much about Christianity.) But I do think it’s fair to view different religions at being good at different things. It’s clear that unlimited forgiveness and redemption were at the core of Jesus’ message and have been maintained as central components of Christianity. I won’t make a comparative statement to Buddhism, but it very well may be that one religion might offer more comfort for trying life stages than others.
Are Hume’s opponents just attacking the wrongheadedness of providing religious advice to strangers, or do they really believe there aren’t meaningful differences that impact people’s lives?
-John
Faith in the Supreme Court
Does a justice’s religion matter?
Under Slate’s “jurisprudence” section, Dahlia Lithwick addresses a taboo subject - the religious beliefs of Supreme Court justices. Interestingly enough, we now have six Catholics on the court, two Jews, and only one Protestant. For reference, about 50% of Americans are Protestant, 24% are Catholic, and only 1% are Jewish.
Ok, so what? Does the religious identity of judges actually influence their decisions? Geoffrey Stone, a law professor at the University of Chicago, has come under fire for suggesting that it might. In Gonzales v. Carhart (which was settled when Justice Souter, an Episcopalian, was still on the court), the five Catholic justices overturned settled precedent on partial birth abortions, while the Jewish and Protestant justices dissented. Stone is uncomfortable with the implications:
By making this judgment, these justices have failed to respect the fundamental difference between religious belief and morality. To be sure, this can be an elusive distinction, but in a society that values the separation of church and state, it is fundamental. The moral status of a fetus is a profoundly difficult and rationally unresolvable question. As the Supreme Court has recognized for more than thirty years, when the fundamental right of a woman “to determine her life’s course” is at stake, it is not for the state — or for the justices of the Supreme Court — to resolve that question, and it is certainly not appropriate for the state or the justices to resolve it on the basis of one’s personal religious faith.
Lithwick shares Stone’s concerns about religious belief seeping into jurisprudence, but posits that a justice’s stance toward strict or evolving precedent is probably more central to controversial moral decisions than personal faith.
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