Everybody knows somebody . . .
. . . who crashed a Toyota.
Toyota has recalled 9 million cars worldwide due to a faulty breaks, bad accelerator pedals, and defective floormats (yes, floormats). The move has come as a shock to many observers, both due to its scope and because Toyota has set the paradigm for high-quality production. Businesses around the world look to Toyota’s unique production philosophy, which emphasizes continuous improvement (kaizen) and features the andon cord–a mechanism which allows any factory floor worker to stop the production line of he or she detects a problem.
Now it appears that Toyota’s entire organization has ignored this philosophy. The automaker was slow to take decisive action, even as reported problems with numerous Toyota models were mounting.
Today, the company’s President apologized in stark terms: “I deeply regret that I caused concern among so many people . . . I believe what is happening now is a very big problem. We are in a crisis.”
From a PR perspective, this is probably too little, too late. But who does bear responsibility when something goes horribly wrong in a large corporation?
As has been discussed previously at The Public Philosopher, the problem of institutional responsibility - in the private sector and in government - is at the heart of many of the central ethical discussions in public life. The contours of social life are shaped by these large institutions: by the local and national governments that make and enforce laws, as well as by the businesses that supply us with material goods, jobs, and entertainment.
But while some of these institutions are good at assigning responsibility out among the public, they’re less effective at assigning it within their own walls. This isn’t (always) because they’re looking to duck blame. Instead, it’s because a chain of seemingly innocuous decisions sometimes adds up to a big problem.
At Toyota, chances are that a lot of good people were simply doing their jobs, unaware that a small but devastating problem was lurking in their cars.
But the company also made two clear mistakes. The first was its languid response to early concerns that there was a pervasive defect in several of Toyota’s product lines. The company was slow to initiate a widespread recall, and it erroneously downplayed the scope of the problem.
The second is that Toyota seems to have been beaten at its own game. The andon cord, kaizen, and other central elements of Toyota culture like genchi genbutsu (which means “go and see,” suggesting that problems should be factually investigated with one’s own eyes) are designed both to improve the caliber of production and, perhaps implicitly, to solve the problem of distributing institutional responsibility within the organization.
These principles empower Toyota employees to take responsibility into their own hands. Even the assembly line Toyota employee can intervene when he or she is concerned, and no employee is above the burden of proof to make sure the job is being carried out correctly.
Toyota has relied on this system to become the world’s largest automaker. But it should also have made Toyota the most proactive company in the car business when it comes to product safety.
The problem here is a profound one for communities, large organizations, and societies. We can make good rules and we can develop a culture that values the spirit of those rules. But even that culture is not enough - by itself - to ward off either the complacency or the competitive pressures that can erode the individual or collective virtue necessary to adhere to those rules. What it takes is kaizen.
-Sam
Image used with a Creative Commons Attribution License from Jyle Dupuis.
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