How we feel versus what we do
In his column today, Nicholas Kristof references philosopher Peter Singer’s famous example of a drowning child to grapple with why several G-8 member countries fall short on their humanitarian aid pledges. Singer’s example first appeared in the landmark 1972 essay “Famine, Affluence and Morality,” in which Singer argued that failing to provide aid to then-East Bengal was tantamount to walking past a drowning child. Distance, argued Singer, does not lessen the moral necessity of action.
The question of how distance impacts moral obligations — if at all — has been hotly debated ever since. Yet Kristof’s response to why moral obligations seem to attenuate over distance raises a related, if not identical issue:
One of the reasons, I believe, is that humanitarians are abjectly ineffective at selling their causes. Any brand of toothpaste is peddled with far more sophistication than the life-saving work of aid groups. Do-gooders also have a penchant for exaggeration, so that the public often has more trust in the effectiveness of toothpaste than of humanitarian aid.
[. . .]
Another factor is personal responsibility: How many people share it? Professor Singer notes that in one experiment, students filled out a market research study while a young woman went behind a curtain and then appeared to climb on a chair to get something – and fell down. She then moaned and cried out that her ankle was injured.
When the person filling out the form was alone, he or she helped 70 percent of the time. But when another person was in the room, also filling out the survey and not responding, then only 7 percent tried to help.
In the case of fighting poverty, there are billions of other bystanders to erode a personal sense of responsibility. Moreover, humanitarian appeals emphasize the scale of the challenges – 25,000 children will die today! – in ways that are as likely to numb us as to galvanize us.
What Kristof touches on here is the distinction between the moral obligations we hold and the moral obligations we feel. Singer’s question is whether or not distance alters moral imperatives, but Kristof explains something different–how distance, the magnitude of the problem, and the communications approach of “do-gooders” changes our sense of obligation.
Our feelings and emotions are good moral guides. If we feel compelled to help a child in distress, that’s a good sign we should act. Yet our emotions are not a complete guide to morality. Kristof provides some sound insight into why our sense of personal responsibility is lessened by problems that are far removed and mind-boggling in scope. He does not ask the more dangerous question: whether distant, seemingly intractable problems do indeed lessen our duty to act.
–Sam
Related posts:
- We must save the children!
- We must save the children
- Religion and foreign aid
- How must we help Haiti?
- A Faustian bargain
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