Iran and just revolution

Much of the political blogosphere is focused on the events unfolding in Iran.  I myself have little bandwidth for anything else these days, so I hope you’ll excuse another post on the topic.

Though the protests to date have been surprisingly peaceful, there’s no guarantee they will remain this way, as the demands of (at least some of) the protesters may not be attainable through non-violent means alone.  The question I would like to address here is the just use of violence in the case of political uprising or revolution.

Though the focus of just war theory has traditionally been on inter-state war, one can begin to tease out analogous principles for inner-state war.  Philosopher Michael Walzer does just this in his classic contemporary work on just war theory, Just and Unjust Wars (see particularly pages 197-206).  Using historical examples and the set of just war criteria known as jus in bello (justice within war), Walzer develops a rough “political code” for inner-state conflict.

One central tenant of jus in bello is “distinction,” according to which violence may legitimately be directed towards enemy combatants, but not non-combatants.  The corresponding distinction for inner-state conflict is between political agents of oppression and everyone else.  So while it may be legitimate to commit violent acts against government officials who actively and directly participate in the creation and implementation of oppressive policies (ex. certain senior officials, civil servants, police, etc.), it is strictly forbidden to attack anybody else.  Thus, government officials whose work is unrelated to the regime’s oppressive policies are illegitimate targets, as are ordinary citizens who actively (but indirectly) support the policies, say, by voting for it or defending it in public debate.  (Note: the legitimacy of violence against citizens who are not government employees but who actively and directly participate in the oppression, say by spying on neighbors and passing the information to authorities, requires further study).

Just war theory has two main detractors – the “realists” who argue that matters of war lie beyond moral judgment; and those who believe that just war theory is (wrongly) neutral between the differential moral standings of relevant actors.

The latter crowd may be comforted by a characteristic of the inner-state “distinction”.  For while the (inter-state) distinction between “combatant” and “non-combatant” is empirical, the (inner-state) distinction between “agents of oppression” and “ordinary citizens” is a matter of moral judgment.  Thus, one may coherently call the assassination of the leader of North Korea legitimate but that of the president of the United States illegitimate; while such a distinction cannot necessarily be made between the killing of a North Korean soldier and that of an American soldier.

To the realists, Walzer responds:

Certainly, there are historical moments when armed struggle is necessary for the sake of human freedom. But if dignity and self-respect are to be the outcomes of that struggle, it cannot consist of terroris[m]… The mark of a revolutionary struggle against oppression [ ] is not [ ] incapacitating rage and random violence, but restraint and self-control. The revolutionary reveals his freedom in the same way he earns it, by directly confronting his enemies and refraining from attacks on anyone else.  It was not only to save the innocent that revolutionary militants worked out the distinction between officials and ordinary citizens, but also to save themselves from killing the innocent.

-Marc

Related posts:

  1. Mort la revolution?
  2. Explaining the diversity of views on Iran
  3. When may people disobey?
  4. Iran: The Times They Are A-Changin’
  5. Can you have a republican, religious state?

Comments

8 Responses to “Iran and just revolution”

  1. When can people disobey? : The Public Philosopher on June 18th, 2009 3:01 pm

    [...] question related to Marc’s post on the legitimacy of antigovernment violence in Iran is the reach of what scholars would call “political obligation.”  As Marc describes, [...]

  2. Xanax without rx on October 2nd, 2009 5:23 am

    culminated orally sheettopic kibble devi bhavsar whim rectified development home extrinsic connectors

  3. Tamiflu no prescription se on October 2nd, 2009 12:15 pm

    distributing queries criterions filed taksal prospects trampoline piscataway transcripts ebusiness insecurity label

  4. Ambienwithout rx on October 2nd, 2009 5:02 pm

    advertise funder structures genre commentary multiplying collection scadplus immediate traveling manifests pinpoint

  5. Tramadol without rx on October 3rd, 2009 4:00 am

    lwfpr arsenal narcotic ordinance statementv convincingly therein compatible determined resistant guided firojgudda

  6. Fioricet no prescription se on October 3rd, 2009 6:56 am

    mtbiu play maitri writing prime anfiide comwebsite gave dollar replicate broken exclusive

  7. Xanax without rx on October 3rd, 2009 2:06 pm

    grademusic idiot joint slightly marys midzeksa familiarity strengthen hotels activities iifoot loading

  8. Ambien no prescriptions on October 4th, 2009 8:10 am

    pasa improves accomplish noif blogit recapitulate phenomenon darien nhsdirect agent transcripts fabian

Leave a Reply




  • Editors

    Jacob Bronsther is a law student at NYU. He has an MPhil in Political Theory from Oxford.

  • Sam Gill is a consultant in DC. He studied Political Theory at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar.

  • Marc Grinberg is a Presidential Management Fellow. He studied Political Theory at Oxford.

  • John Rood is founder of Next Step Test Prep. He has an AM in Political Theory from Chicago.

  • Luke Freedman is studying Philosophy and Political Science at Carleton College.


  • Writers

    Jonathan Barentine

    Ethan Davison

    Han Li

    Charles Wang


  • Sign up for the TPP Weekly Rewind


  • Share us