Obama’s change: minor or major?
Back in December, I wrote a piece for the Christian Science Monitor on the meaning of “Change” for Obama and America. A few months later it is only clearer that by sheathing his policies under the banner of “pramatism” and eschewing any talk of “rights” Obama is arguing that he is not changing American values or philosophy, just its policies.
Here’s the original piece:
Our policies will change: Will our values, too?
(December 1, 2008) New York – Barack Obama has sheathed himself in a single word: change. And yet uncertainty lingers as to its genuine meaning, both for him and for America.
The two fundamental ingredients to politics are values and policies. Every policy manifests some set of values and principles. For instance, the policy of a minimum wage embodies a judgment on the value of fairness. With this in mind, political change can take one of two main forms. It can overhaul both a community’s values and its policies (Change 1). Or it can keep the community’s values, but modify its policies (Change 2).
Change 1 is revolutionary. It alters a society’s moral foundation, which in turn reshapes its policies; everything is different. Communist government in America would constitute this sort of change.
Change 2 is subtler and distinctly American. A supporter of Change 2 might argue that American values – those enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution – are good, but that they are not reflected in national policies. This is Martin Luther King’s style of change. The civil rights movement, in its effective forms, did not argue that American values were flawed, but rather that the system needed to more fully embrace them.
Americans, generally, fear Change 1. We distrust any notion that we should alter the liberal values of the Founding Fathers. We are conservative liberals.
The issue today is whether Mr. Obama offers Change 1 or Change 2.
Obama, unsurprisingly, argues that he offers Change 2. He presents himself as a steady pragmatist who will bring reason and cool judgment to the White House. He implies that his policies – on taxation, diplomacy, energy, and healthcare – are the products of prudent reflection on Bush’s failures, not on any abstract philosophy that conflicts with that of Madison and Jefferson. He portrays his vision as nonideological and thus embraceable by a grand coalition of Americans. Toward that end, he promises to calm the partisan tone of Washington politics.
During the presidential campaign, John McCain’s supporters disagreed, often pronouncing Obama’s politics radical, socialist, or otherwise “un-American.”
Obama’s relationship to American values is not as simple as either side would like us to imagine. His ideology is a mix of early 20th-century American thought. He takes a large dose of William James’s pragmatism, with its commitment to doing whatever “works.” In practice, that means ignoring messy philosophical debates and empowering experts in the public arena. Pragmatism is ideologically anti-ideological. He then adds some of Randolph Bourne’s passion for cultural and intellectual pluralism.
Obama’s probable cabinet reflects these components. It includes a woman (Hillary Clinton), a Latino (Bill Richardson), a Republican (Robert Gates), a former Republican (Timothy Geithner), and an African-American (Eric Holder), all noted for their rarified intelligence and competence.
Obama rounds out his ideology with a helping of FDR’s expanded notion of human rights. In aiming to deliver “freedom from want,” it moves beyond mere access to a democratic system to include a host of “positive rights.”
Clearly then, Obama’s values have American roots. The question, however, is whether these values are necessarily American. If people view pragmatism, pluralism, and positive human rights – which include the right to healthcare – as American values, they will see Obama as an inspiring agent for Change 2. But if they think these values are inimical to true American values, say, of personal responsibility, strict property rights, and limited government, they will fear Obama as an agent for Change 1.
For America to unite as Obama imagined, the nation must decide on its shared principles and priorities. It is unlikely, however, that a national discussion will bear fruit. The election was much closer than the Electoral College reveals. Nearly half of all voters supported a candidate with a starkly different understanding of American values.
That said, the most contentious portion of Obama’s ideology – his commitment to positive rights – may be too expensive to prioritize right now, given current economic conditions. Conversely, Obama may view this crisis as the perfect opportunity to enact the bold social policies on which he campaigned. Whenever this move occurs, in a few months or a few years, Obama’s relationship to American values, and the type of change he presents, will once more become the major question mark that hangs over him.
Forgive and forget?
by Sam
Although the Obama Administration’s evolving position on torture during the Bush era undoubtedly counts as the most fraught, complex and compelling ethical issue of the day, I’d rather focus on this interesting but ancillary gem from our President:
This is a time for reflection, not retribution. I respect the strong views and emotions that these issues evoke. We have been through a dark and painful chapter in our history. But at a time of great challenges and disturbing disunity, nothing will be gained by spending our time and energy laying blame for the past. Our national greatness is embedded in America’s ability to right its course in concert with our core values, and to move forward with confidence. That is why we must resist the forces that divide us, and instead come together on behalf of our common future.
Obama is saying something significant here about the nature of the crime and the idea of responsibility. He is, first and foremost, casting off the notion that torture in these instances really violated any meaningful law (even if it offended American or global principles).
He is also saying something more fundamental about the kind of responsibility at issue. Retributive justice, the bedrock of our criminal justice system, seeks to assign blame for harm caused. A forward-looking model of responsibility would attempt to address the systems, structures, or behaviors that allowed the harm to take place. Obama appears to be favoring the latter approach.
But there is something in between. South Africa’s post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commissions sought to give the abused a chance to speak retrospectively, while, at the same time, laying a foundation for future progress. In essence, they tried to heal South Africa’s wounds by talking about them aloud.
A similar idea for the American case achieved some attention, when Senator Patrick Leahy proposed a Truth Commission to investigate potential Bush-era malfeasance in the treatment of terror suspects.
Responsibility tends to be a case of different strokes for different folks. Where a desire for revenge dominates, retribution carries the day. When there tend to be few strong victims, a forward-looking approach prevails. But when a victim demand for voice is met by the collective need to move on, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions have been forwarded to fill the void.
Their ultimate success, however, remains a matter of great debate.
The Obama Doctrine, Part Deux
by Sam
Peter Baker isn’t so sure there’s a new Obama Doctrine.
Is there an Obama Doctrine?
by Sam
In today’s Washington Post, esteemed liberal columnist E.J. Dionne praises what he calls the emerging Obama Doctrine of foreign policy:
Obama’s doctrine departs from the previous administration’s approach by embracing a longer tradition of American foreign policy. Obama insists that the United States can’t achieve great objectives on its own, even though it is “always harder to forge true partnerships and sturdy alliances than to act alone,” as he put it this month in Strasbourg, France.
This may break with George W. Bush’s style — particularly at the level of rhetoric, and especially during Bush’s first term — but it is in keeping with the traditions of Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman and George H.W. Bush. Obama insists that we do not have unlimited resources to do whatever we want, whenever we want to. We have to make choices. Thus is his buildup in Afghanistan premised on a gradual withdrawal from Iraq.
And the Obama Doctrine seeks to regain the world’s sympathy by acknowledging that while the United States is a great nation built on worthy principles, it is not perfect.
Is this really a doctrine? The Bush Doctrine is a principle: preemptive force is justified in the face of imminent threats. So is the Monroe Doctrine: European colonization in the Americas is an act of aggression against the United States.
What is the Obama Doctrine? “We can’t go it alone.”
That might be more a statement of fact than principle.
Joseph Nye: America needs this blog…
Well, that’s almost a direct quote.
In a Washington Post op-ed, Harvard Prof. Joe Nye argues that the work being done in university political science departments is increasingly irrelevant to the policy challenges that face government officials.
Nye has credibility on the issue: he is one of the few academics with substantial policy experience – he was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the 90s and it is rumored that he will soon be appointed Ambassador to Japan; and his own academic work is actually policy relevant – he coined the term and has written extensively on “soft power.”
Nye’s article is largely focused on the field of international relations, but his argument rings true across the political science discipline. Of course, “the growing gap between theory and policy” is not all bad. It has, as Nye notes, “produced better social science theory.” But it has also created a need for work designed to bridge the two. Within the field of political philosophy, this blog serves that purpose.
The impact of public philosophy
Via Matt Yglesias and Ezra klein:
Why John Rawls Didn’t Win us Any Senate Seats
Family ties
by Sam
Yesterday, the Obama Administration eased family travel and remittance restrictions with Cuba and sketched some initial steps to improve telecommunications with the communist island. In the White House fact sheet on “Reaching out the Cuban people,” a surprising rationale appeared:
Cuban American connections to family in Cuba are not only a basic right in humanitarian terms, but also our best tool for helping to foster the beginnings of grassroots democracy on the island.
This statement concisely captures what one could call the intrinsic and extrinsic reasons for pursuing these measures:
Intrinsic: it’s the right thing to do.
Extrinsic: it will achieve other, ancillary goals.
The extrinsic reasons make good sense. The United States has been unwilling to abandon its public commitment to Cuban democracy and the new, softer Obama touch on foreign policy would seem to support this course.
The intrinsic reasons are more suspect. Formalized family relations abroad a human right? In an increasingly diasporic world, the inclination of many nations has been to resist close family ties across borders, not support them.
It’s hard to believe that the Obama Administration is really committed to this interpretation of human rights. If so, it would be a watershed declaration. As it stands, it’s more likely to be overlooked and forgotten.
The conscience clause and liberty
by John
Stanley Fish has a luciid discussion of the question of whether health care professionals should be allowed to refuse to perform or recommend certain treatments that offend their conscience, the so-called “conscience clause.” The occasion is uncertainty of whether Obama will overturn this directive, enacted by George W. Bush. As usual, Fish takes the reader through a few competing perspectives including, as always, the perspective of the US Supreme court as well as questioning the meaning of conscience, citing Hobbes.
Fish’s last word makes the liberal argument:
This sequestering of religion in a private space is a cornerstone of enlightenment liberalism which only works as a political system if everyone agrees to comport himself or herself as a citizen and not as a sectarian, at least for the purposes of public transactions.
However, the traditional liberal argument is weaker here than Fish might imagine. [One caveat -- all of this assumes that the physician is refusing to undertake a procedure, not giving advice. The situation is quite different if the doctor is, from his or her own moral base, giving controversial or sub-optimal advice to patients who are ill-equipped to know when their doctor does not have their best interests at heart. The obvious example is a "pro-life" doctor advising women against abortion in every instance and without providing all alternatives.]
First, there are lines to be drawn as to what the preservation of the liberal order can compel one to do. The liberal case is much stronger when it’s claim is that the citizen must refrain from acting, or, stronger still, when all that is compelled is a basic tolerance for the lives of others. The arguement is weaker when, as Fish seems to claim, the rules of the liberal order compel voluntary action in ways that violate the conscience.
Secondly, Fish gives a great deal of credence to the obligations of the profession (medicine), but I do not believe these obligations are as strong or compelling as he thinks. The doctor is bound by certain rules and codes of behavior (certainly the Hippocratic oath) but the doctor does not affirm that he will complete every procedure requested by the patient. Further, the development of new procedures which shock the conscience would be a serious threat to the profession, as each new development would require each physician to re-examine their oath.
Finally, in brief, Fish seems to place a great deal of weight in the inconvenience to the patient in finding a new physician, which seems to be slight for those of us who have gotten many referrels without incident.
From the source
by Sam
The closest thing America has to applied philosophy in governance is its Supreme Court (and, to some extent, the many state supreme courts). The high court interprets our basic shared commitments, the Constitution. Whatever our individual or collective worldviews, the Constitution expresses the terms of government, and specifies our fundamental political rights and obligations. Frequently, in ruling on the Constitution, the Supreme Court is forced to take up questions about just what ideas like liberty or equality really mean.
It’s rare that justices on the Court speak publicly, so, when they do, it’s news. Clarence Thomas recently addressed a group of students at a dinner sponsored by the Bill of Rights Institute. Among his notable statements, the New York Times reports the following mention of rights:
‘Today there is much focus on our rights,” Justice Thomas said. “Indeed, I think there is a proliferation of rights.”
“I am often surprised by the virtual nobility that seems to be accorded those with grievances,” he said. “Shouldn’t there at least be equal time for our Bill of Obligations and our Bill of Responsibilities?”
He gave examples: “It seems that many have come to think that each of us is owed prosperity and a certain standard of living. They’re owed air conditioning, cars, telephones, televisions.”
Those are luxuries, Justice Thomas said.
Risky business
by Sam
The New York Times plugs a recent article in Smithsonian magazine on how seatbelts – now a fifty year-old invention – can actually exacerbate auto accidents by encouraging risky behavior.
The Smithsonian piece documents the relationship between safety devices like seatbelts and a phenomenon behavioral scientists call “risk compensation” and economists call “moral hazard.” The idea is roughly that confidence in safety (physical or financial) encourages risk taking. For drivers, this means that seat-belts might actually encourage riskier driving and, for bankers, it suggests that $700 billion in bailouts incites riskier investment strategies.
From a rational perspective, the position makes sense. If we know we are insulated from the potentially damaging consequences of our actions, they tend diminish on our personal balance sheet of risks and rewards. There’s also some good evidence that the phenomenon obtains, although there’s equally good evidence that people ignore or even pursue risk even without risk-reducing safety measures.
From an ethical perspective, the challenges posed by risk compensation are profound. Some public safety measures (such as requiring paramedics to treat injuries) seem justified even if they promote risk-taking. Many people would feel uncomfortable at the prospect of denying care to a reckless motorcyclist, even if he took on additional risk because he knew he would receive public aid.
On the other hand, we deny individuals innumerable choices in the name of limiting risk (for example, we don’t have a choice to drive without a seatbelt), so empirical knowledge of how these regulations encourage or discourage risk seems like relevant information in public decision making.
The deeper question, however, is how to most effectively combine social scientific data with the moral principles we believe should underlie our laws. Studies on how seatbelt usage contributes to accidents tell us facts about the world, not the right and wrong way to live. That decision, while informed by sound knowledge of human behavior, has to do with where we draw the line between individual choice – and all the risks it entails – and the collective good.
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